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Summary findings
Evidence about how choice of regulatory regime affects  regime, and use narrower classifications for regulatory
the level of shareholder risk for the regulated company  regime. They also look at such recent evidence as the
has traditionally focused on studies in the United  move from relatively pure price caps in the U.K.
Kingdom and the United States. Broad comparisons of  electricity sector to a mixed-revenue/price-cap-based
price-cap-based regimes (as practiced in the United  system.
Kingdom) with rate-of-return  regulation (as practiced in  The results of their survey are in line with results from
the United States) show price-cap-based regimes to be  earlier research. They find that investors bear the
associated with higher levels of shareholder risk (as  greatest nondiversifiable risk with price caps and the
measured by the beta value) than rate-of-return  least nondiversifiable risk with rate-of-return regulation.
regulation is. But so few countries were compared that  Once governments and regulatory agencies quantify
other factors could be at work.  how the choice of regulatory regime affects the average
Alexander, Mayer, and Weeds broaden the  level of shareholder risk, they can weigh the relative
investigation by studying more countries (including  merits of various options not only in terms of incentives
regulated utilities in Canada, Europe, and Latin  for cost reduction but also in terms of the allowable level
America), doing a sectoral comparison to control for  of investor profit.
some risks related to factors other than the regulatory
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This paper investigates the impact of different regulatory systems on the degree of market
risk  to  which  a  regulated  company  is  exposed.  Market  risk,  unlike  firmn-specific,
idiosyncratic  risk,  cannot  be  eliminated  by means  of portfolio  diversification  and  is
therefore of great importance to risk-averse investors. A higher level of market risk must
be compensated with higher average retums, thus an increase in non-diversifiable risk
raises a company's cost of capital.
Price-cap  regulation  as  practised  in  the  UK  is  widely thought  to  provide  superior
incentives for cost efficiency compared with US-style rate-of-return regulation, benefiting
consumers in the long run through lower prices. However, there is a possible drawback of
price controls: in its pure form, this type of regulation takes no account of cost or demand
changes related to the economic cycle, thus raising the degree of market risk to which a
company is exposed.  This  'regulatory risk'  increases the company's  cost  of capital as
investors  require higher average returns in  compensation. Ultimately, consumer prices
must be raised so that the company can finance its investments, undermining the benefits
in terms of lower prices from the efficiency gains associated with the system.
A few studies  have attempted to  compare the risks associated  with the UK  price-cap
system and US rate-of-return regulation by studying the asset beta coefficients'  of utility
companies in these two countries. In general, US utilities are found to have much lower
asset beta values, supporting the hypothesis that rate-of-return regulation involves lower
regulatory risk. However, the observed difference in beta values may be due to a number
of  other  factors  and  could,  therefore,  have  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  alternative
regulatory  systems.  The  companies'  operating  environments  are very  different,  with
variations in the level of competition, market risks, geographical composition and non-
utility activities.
1 Section  2.2 explains  the difference  between  asset betas  and equity  betas.
1In  order  to  study  the  effects  of  alternative regulatory  regimes  on  market  risk,  it  is
necessary to control for all other factors that may influence beta values. However, it is not
feasible to find two companies that are similar in every respect apart from their regulatory
systems and such a  straightforward comparison cannot be made.  A study involving  a
large number of companies, operating in environments that are similar in some respects
but different in others, should allow the effects of various factors to be disentangled so
that  the  influence of  regulation  on  the  cost  of  capital  may be  inferred.  This  paper
considers evidence from a large number of countries, covering Europe, North and South
America, and the Pacific region.
Linked to the above question of considering the whole regime, is the problem of focusing
on just  one specific element of what is a complete financial package. Betas cannot be
studied in isolation from the determination of the rate base, the way in which investment
is  treated,  and  several  other financial  factors. This  analysis focuses  on  one  specific
element of regulation: namely, the systematic risk of utilities operating under  different
regulatory regimes.
Another benefit of this approach, aside from the US/UK studies, is that the UK can be
compared  with other newly-established systems of regulation. Even if  the higher beta
values of UK compared with US utilities can be attributed to regulatory risk, this may be
because the US system is long established and enshrined in case law whereas the UK
regime is new and subject to change (particularly by political influences), rather than the
difference  between  rate-of-return and  price-cap regulation  per  se.  A  comparison  of
recently privatised companies under alternative systems of regulation will allow a more
accurate assessment of the effect of regime differences on the cost of capital.
There are also a few cases where a shift of regulatory regime occurs within a country.
Such  an example  is useful  as it automatically controls for market  factors and  should
therefore provide an accurate picture of the influence of the regulatory regime on the cost
2of capital. Care must be taken, however, if other factors change at the same time: for
example, a change in regulatory regime is often accompanied by liberalisation to increase
competition in the sector. The data series must be split into two periods, corresponding to
the two regulatory regimes, so that beta values can be calculated in each case. The date at
which  the break should  be made is  less clear than may be  thought: if  the change  is
anticipated, the shift in beta occurs at the announcement date, but  if it takes time  for
investors to learn about the change and its effects, a later date may be appropriate.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the measurement of a company's
systematic risk, while the influence of alternative regulatory systems on this form of risk
is considered in Section 3. Other factors affecting systematic risk and the cost of capital,
which tend to obscure international comparisons of regulatory risk using beta values, are
covered in Section 4. After outlining the possible approaches to analysing regulatory risk
using international data in Section 5, calculated beta values and significant comparisons
are  summarised  in  Section  6.  Section  7  reviews  these  results  and  considers  what
conclusions concerning regulatory risk may be drawn from this study.
There  are four  appendices  to  this  paper.  Appendix  Al  considers  the  practical  and
conceptual difficulties that arise when estimating beta values. These problems are likely
to be particularly serious when international comparisons are made, such that the beta
estimates  for  different  countries  may be  biased  to  differing  extents  or  in  different
directions,  which  could  result  in  distorted  and  misleading  estimates.  Appendix  A2
contains  details  of  asset  beta  values  estimated  for  companies  in  a  wide  variety  of
countries  and utility sectors. Appendix A3 illustrates the effect of varying the interval
length of the data from which beta estimates are derived, and Appendix A4 examines
confidence limits for beta estimates.
32.  Market Risk and the Cost of Capital
2.1  Risk and return
Risk-averse investors holding a portfolio of assets wish to  maximise their returns  and
minimise  the  degree  of risk  to  which  they  are exposed.  When  a  stake  is held  in  a
particular security, two types of risk must be considered. Firm-specific risk, unlike market
risk, can be eliminated by portfolio diversification as changes in one share price will be
offset by opposing movements in others. All securities, however, bear a degree of market
risk which cannot be reduced by diversification. This form of risk is due to economy-
wide factors which affect all securities simultaneously, although to varying degrees. For
example,  when  an  economy  enters recession,  most  companies  tend  to  be  adversely
affected, although the extent of the falls in turnover and profit will differ across firms.
Because it  cannot be  reduced  by diversification,  investors demand  greater  returns  in
compensation for bearing a higher level of market risk, thus increasing the cost of capital.
The most commonly used measure of the undiversifiable risk associated with a company
is its equity beta value. This  measures the extent to  which the returns on the security
moves with the market as a whole. It is defined as follows:
PEi  =  covariance  (rirm)
variance  (rm)
where: ,IEi  =  beta value for security i;
ri = return on security i;
rm  = return on the market portfolio.
42.2  Asset betas
The equity beta measures two types of risk; fundamental business risk and financial risk.
When  making comparisons across countries it is the fundamental risk  that  should be
compared. This is measured through the asset beta. Comparable asset beta values can be
calculated as follows:
IAi  =  PEi (1 - Gi)  + GI.  fiDi
where: PAi  =  asset beta for security i;
P 3i, = equity beta for security i;
Gi = gearing ratio for security i.
BDi = debt beta for security i.
Correction for gearing differences is particularly important in an international context.
For example, firms in the United States tend to be highly geared relative to those in the
UK due to differences in tax policy, institutional arrangements, industrial structure and
business culture. Changes in gearing ratios over time must also be taken into account. If a
company has experienced significant shifts in gearing (or any other factor), beta values
must be calculated over fairly short periods, otherwise the resulting estimate is an average
of several regimes and is not very meaningful. For this reason, the beta estimates in this
paper have been produced using daily data over periods of a small number of years.
A general assumption that is applied is that fiDi  =  0;  this simplifies the calculation of the
amount to:
Ai =  Ei  (I-  G)
5The validity of the JDi  = 0 assumption can be questioned, especially when debt forms a
large proportion of the capital structure of a company. 2 However, for the purposes of this
study the  standard assumption will be  applied. The impact of non-zero debt betas  is
investigated further in Appendix 1.
2The  debt beta can be estimated as 
13Di =  ERP
ERP
63.  The Effect of Regulatory  Structure  on Risk
The design of a regulatory system has a significant impact on the degree of systematic
risk borne by a company. In general, there is a trade-off between incentives to improve
efficiency and the degree of risk to which a company is exposed. A company will not
strive to lower its costs unless it benefits from these redactions, but an inability to pass on
cost changes to customers means that the company faces risk from uncontrollable  cost
fluctuations.
The  impacts  of  alternative regulatory  regimes  may  be  illustrated  by  means  of  the
following formula for a company's profits:
rI =  PQ  -Cx(Q)  -Cn(Q
where: rl  = total profits;
P = unit price;
Q = quantity sold;
PQ = revenue earned;
C. = exogenous (uncontrollable) costs, a function of quantity;
C, = endogenous (controllable) costs, a function of quantity.
Table  3.1  shows  the  coverage of  alternative regulatory regimes:  in  each  case,  some
elements of the profit formula are controlled by regulation while others are ignored, so
that the company has incentives to act efficiently. These are the 'pure'  cases; hybrids can
be designed to allow a different set of elements to be controlled.
7Table  3.1: Profit  elements  covered  by alternative  regulatory  regimes
Regulatory system  Covered by regulation  Ignored by regulation
Price cap  P  Q, Cx, C.
Price cap with cost pass-through  P, Cx  Q, C.
Revenue cap  PQ  C., C.
Rate-of-return regulation  PQ, C', C.
3.1  Price-cap  regulation
Pure price-cap regulation involves the setting of prices over a long period of time such
that a well-run company can expect to earn a fair rate of return, but the opportunity to
earn higher profits  gives it a  greater incentive for efficiency. The  system is forward-
looking: reasonable cost levels must be forecast far into the future with a high degree of
accuracy so that reasonable prices can be set. If this is done effectively, higher profits
come from greater efforts by the company in reducing its cost levels below those which
were reasonably expected and reflect the efficiency benefits of the system.
However, the desirable incentive properties of price-cap regulation have a cost in terms of
the  risk  to  which  the  company is  exposed.  The  lack  of  automatic  price  adjustment
mechanisms means that the company is exposed to all cost changes, including those over
which  it has  no  control. The  risks  involved  in price-cap  regulation  are likely  to  be
reflected in its cost of capital, as investors will demand a higher average rate of return in
compensation for bearing additional risk.
In  practice,  price-cap  regulation  requires  periodic  price  reviews  in  order  to  correct
imbalances and eventually to pass the benefits of greater efficiency on to customers. At
this point, the price-cap system bears some similarities to rate-of-return regulation, as one
important consideration in the setting of prices is the rate of return that the company may
be expected to earn at those levels.
8When utility privatisations were carried  out in the UK,  a price-cap system, known  as
RPI - X, was introduced to regulate monopoly businesses. Under this regime, price levels
are constrained to rise each year only by the amount of the retail (consumer) price index
(RPI)  minus  an  efficiency  factor,  X  (or  plus  a  K  factor  in  the  case  of  the  water
companies).  Price-cap  regulation  was  also  introduced  into  the  regulation  of  the  US
telecommunications company AT&T in 1989.
3.2  Price caps with cost pass-through
In recognition of the fact that certain cost elements are beyond the control of the regulated
company and that exposure to such variables increases risk with no benefit in terms of
incentives, most price-cap regimes allow for some cost pass-through. These mechanisms
allow certain cost changes outside of the company's control to be passed on to customers
without waiting for the next periodic price review. The level of risk borne by investors is
lowered  and  the  company's  cost  of  capital  should  therefore  be  reduced,  while  the
incentive properties of the system are not undermined as long as these cost elements are
truly uncontrollable.
The only drawback for a regulated company is the possibility that cost pass-through may
be carried out in an asymmetric manner and therefore expose the company to more, rather
than less, risk. The regulator may use discretionary powers to recoup company profits
when exogenous costs have fallen (say, lower construction costs due to the recent slump
in the building industry), but then refuse to allow unavoidable cost increases to be passed
on to customers. Thus, unless cost pass-through mechanisms are formalised so as to be
fair to both the company and its customers, they could give rise to asymmetric risk and
increase rather than lower beta values.
9Most of the UK RPI - X formulae allow for certain uncontrollable cost elements to be
passed through to customers. The water companies were initially allowed to pass through
a variety of uncontrollable cost elements, such as rates, construction expenditure and the
costs  of compliance with  new legal requirements, although the number and  extent  of
these  'relevant  changes  of circumstance'  has  since been  curtailed. 3 In the  electricity
industry, the regional electricity companies (RECs) are permitted to pass on any changes
in  electricity  generation  costs  (although  these  are  subject  to  separate  controls).  In
Argentina, on the other hand, electricity companies are not entitled to  automatic pass-
through  of fuel costs, presumably to  give them an  incentive to generate electricity  as
cheaply as possible and to respond to changes in relative fuel prices by altering the fuel
mix.
3.3  Revenue caps
A revenue cap places a limit on the total income of the company rather than the per-unit
price it charges. This  system makes sense when the majority of a company's costs are
fixed rather than increasing with the number of units sold. A company with high fixed
costs that is under price-cap regulation faces excessive risk from demand fluctuations as
these  movements  significantly  affect  the  company's  income  but  leave  its  cost  level
relatively unchanged. Thus,  a  revenue cap reduces the risk-exposure  of  the company
without undermining cost incentives in any way (as long as the permitted revenue is not
based on actual cost levels).
In the UK, Northern Ireland Electricity was privatised in June  1993 with a revenue-cap
rather than a price-cap formula, while partial revenue caps have been introduced for the
RECs  and National  Grid Company following periodic  reviews. This  change  was due
partly  to  arguments  concerning  the  level  of  fixed  costs  in  the  industry,  which  the
3 The companies  that agreed to the changes were allowed  a higher rate of return at the 1994 Periodic
Review  in recognition  of the increased  cost of capital  arising  from  the loss of cost pass-through.
10companies claim are not recouped through the existing fixed charges to customers, and
also to correct a perverse incentive effect of the pure price-cap system. When company
income is linked to the number of units sold while costs are mainly fixed, the companies
have no incentive to encourage the efficient use of electricity. In fact, companies would
gain by encouraging customers to waste power, in  conflict with  the energy-efficiency
measures that they are supposed to encourage.
Several variants of revenue-cap regulation are available. A pure revenue cap sets a lump-
sum  annual  amount  without reference to  actual cost  elements,  presumably based  on
historical  levels.  Alternatively, permitted  revenues could be  linked  to  an  observable
feature,  such as the number of customers, to which fixed cost levels are related. This
would  allow changes in  the exogenous  factors driving fixed  costs to  be  matched  by
changes in revenue without waiting for the next periodic review. Another possibility is
the use of an hybrid price/revenue cap to mimic the balance between fixed and variable
costs in the industry, so that incentives to increase sales are not distorted. This essentially
is the approach now taken in the regulation of the UK electricity industry.
3.4  Rate-of-return regulation
Under pure rate-of-return regulation, a company is guaranteed an agreed rate of return on
capital and its prices are adjusted as required to ensure that this rate is earned. In this
situation, the company bears very little risk as any unforeseen costs can quickly be passed
on to customers. Due to the lack of risk, the agreed rate of return can be fairly low and
prices to customers can be kept down.
In practice, however, rate-of-return regulation is not this straightforward or free from risk.
Price  adjustment  reviews,  although  frequent,  do  not  allow  instantaneous  cost  pass-
through and the company is exposed to some risk. The rate-of-return system encourages
over-capitalisation by companies, as allowable profits are directly related to the size of
11the capital base, and regulators in the United States have responded to this by disallowing
(for regulatory purposes) any capital expenditure seen to have been imprudently incurred.
The need for regulatory approval adds to investment risks, particularly if the regulator
cannot precommit to including the asset in the capital base. If investors feel that they are
not assured of gaining a return on their investment, a higher allowed rate of return will be
required on projects that  gain approval so that the  ex  ante  expected rate of  return is
sufficient for funds to be obtained.
3.5  Hybrid and discretionary systems
3.5.1  Price/revenue cap
As explained in Section 3.3, revenue caps have recently been introduced into the
regulatory formulae of the UK electricity industry to reflect the level of fixed costs
in the industry. This has generally been achieved in conjunction with the existing
price caps rather than by replacing them altogether. Hybrid price/revenue caps are
now applied to the distribution businesses of the RECs in England and Wales, and
to the transmission and distribution revenues of Northern Ireland Electricity.
A pure revenue cap should not be used in industries with a high level of marginal
costs as, in this case, an increase in demand would raise costs with no matching
increase in revenues, exposing the company to excessive risk. Rather, an hybrid
price/revenue  cap  should  be  used  to  mimic  the  balance  between  fixed  and
marginal costs, so that the company is given the correct incentives to  promote
sales  and  is  not  exposed  to  excessive  risks  from  demand  fluctuations.  Cost-
efficiency incentives are maintained since the regulated company benefits in full
from any cost-reducing activities it undertakes.
123.5.2  Price-cap/rate-of-return regulation
Most regulatory systems can be regarded as hybrids between pure rate-of-return
and  pure  price-cap  regulation, depending  on  the  length  of  time  that  elapses
between reviews and the degree of automatic cost pass-through. For example, the
UK RPI - X price-cap system reviews prices approximately every five years and,
in most  sectors, allows pass-through of certain unavoidable costs. Discretionary
powers may also be used to recoup excessive profits between periodic reviews, in
effect, reducing the price-cap system to a rate-of-return regime. The ability of the
regulator to claw back high profits exposes the regulated company to asymmetric
risk, as high profit rates cannot be earned but there is no corresponding floor on
the amount of losses that may be made.
To reduce the degree of asymmetric risk, it must be made clear that discretionary
powers will be used to  protect companies from excessive  and unexpected cost
increases, as well as to recoup excess profits, so that the companies'  downside
risks  are also  curtailed.  For  example, the  water companies  may press  for  an
assurance that  allowance will  be  made  for  the  costs  of  complying  with  any
additional environmental requirements which they may face in the future.
Explicit hybrid  schemes may place  a floor  and a ceiling on the rate  of return
which  may be  earned by  a  regulated company. Alternatively,  a  less  extreme
system might allow all profits  to be kept in a band  around the  'target'  rate of
return, while any further gain or loss relative to this level is shared between the
company and its customers. Explicit profit-sharing or  'sliding-scale'  regulation
was used  in  the  UK  and  United States  in  the late  nineteenth  century and  is
currently  under  discussion in  the  UK. 4 Under  such  a  scheme,  a  sharing  rule
divides excess profits between customers and shareholders by allowing dividend
or rate-of-return increases only if prices are simultaneously cut.
4 For further  details see Burns,  Turvey  and Weyman-Jones  (1995), 'Sliding  scale regulation  of monopoly
enterprises',  Centre  for the Study  of Regulated  Industries,  Discussion  Paper 11,  May.
13An example of sliding-scale regulation is  the system governing the New York
Telephone  Company  established  in  1986,  which  operated  according  to  the
following rules.
Table 3.2: An example of sliding-scale regulation
Rate of return, R (%)  Adjustment to revenues
Over 15  Revenues adjusted down by ½/2(R  - 15)
Between 13 and 15  No adjustment
Under 13  Revenues adjusted up by '2(13 - R)
Source: Laffont and Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT
Press, p. 16.
Under this scheme, full cost-efficiency incentives are retained in the intermediate
band of 13-15%  as any profit changes are passed through to the company in full.
In the higher and lower bands, incentives are weakened as 50% of any gain or loss
accrues to customers: this is the cost of avoiding excessive profits on the upside
and excessive risk to the company on the downside. Incentives are stronger than
under US-style rate-of-return regulation but far weaker than under the price-cap
system.
3.5.3  Discretionary systems
In  many  countries,  particularly  in  continental  Europe,  utility  companies  are
controlled without the kind of explicit regulatory framework that exists in the UK
and  United States. In Austria, for example, gas prices  are set  by a committee
composed of a wide spectrum of interests, with representatives from government
ministries, industry, agriculture and labour.
Under a discretionary system, it is unclear what criteria are used in setting prices
and  the  regime  cannot  even  be  approximated  to  rate-of-return  or  price-cap
14regulation. It seems unlikely that high-powered efficiency incentives are in force
or that high profits or losses may ever be made, thus the system seems close to
rate-of-return regulation. On the other hand, the scope for political  interference
may expose companies to excessive risk and cause their beta values to be higher
than those of US utility companies.
154.  Other Factors Affecting the Cost of Capital
This  section examines factors other than the form of regulatory regime which have an
impact on the beta value of a regulated company. In this study it is very important that
such influences are taken into account as they prevent any straightforward comparison
being drawn between the beta values of utility companies  operating under  alternative
regulatory regimes. International variations in these factors are briefly outlined as these
must be considered as possible explanations for any cross-country differences that may be
found in estimated beta values.
4.1  Ownership
Although this study covers only privately-owned, quoted companies, many have partial or
even majority stakes held by the national government. In some countries, the national
constitution or public sentiment prevents full privatisation of utility companies, while in
others, partial privatisation is merely  a prelude to full floatation. In several European
countries,  the  mix  of  state  and  private  ownership  is  the  result  of  the  historical
development of these industries and may vary widely across sectors and  geographical
regions.
Partial  or majority government ownership is likely to  have the following effects on a
company:
*  implicit state control over prices and other business matters;
*  protection from bankruptcy and takeover;
*  a lower cost of capital as the government is seen as the ultimate guarantor of any
debt.
16Government protection from bankruptcy and takeover should reduce a company's cost of
capital, but political  interference in business activities may increase it. In a few cases,
privatisation is complete but the government retains a 'golden share', enabling it to veto
any proposed takeover bid. The golden shares in the UK water companies and the RECs
were redeemed in December 1994 and March 1995 respectively.
Additional  controls  were  enforced  through  a  15%  shareholding  rule,  preventing
individual shareholders from holding more than 15% of a company's voting equity. This
control was removed from all water companies  apart from Welsh Water  in December
1994 and is due to be removed from all RECs in the year 2000. However, the restriction
can be abolished by an extraordinary general meeting, a move which so far has been taken
by the majority of RECs. These changes are summarised in Table 4.1. It is possible that
these changes may affect the companies'  cost of capital, if the sensitivity of their share
prices to the state of the economy has been altered.
Table 4.1: Abolition of government controls in UK utility sectors
Date  Event
December  31st 1994  Abolition  of golden  shares  in the water companies
Abolition of the 15% shareholding  rule in all water companies  apart from
Welsh  Water
March  31st 1995  Abolition  of golden  shares  in the RECs
March  31st 2000  Abolition  of the 15%  rule in any RECs  where  it still  applies
Golden  shares  and  limits  on  the  level  of  shareholding  are  seen  in  other  countries;
Copenhagen Airport is one such example.
Utility privatisations in South America have frequently taken place through the sale of an
initial stake to a private (perhaps international) consortium followed by a public flotation
at a later  date. This procedure increases the value of the company at flotation  due to
improvements made during the initial period of private operation, which may also involve
the introduction of foreign expertise. It may result, however, in the final structure of the
17company being dominated by the stakeholdings of companies involved in the preliminary
private  sale, which may therefore exercise considerable control over  the company and
affect its cost of capital.
In south-east Asia, limited privatisation of utility industries has generally occurred via
private finance deals for new projects rather than the sale of existing state-owned assets.
In such a deal, a private consortium is granted a concession to build and operate a plant
for a fixed period, after which ownership may be transferred to the national government.
In the absence of any public flotation, equity betas cannot be calculated. Instead, the risk
of the project will be incorporated into the cost of capital of the participating companies,
which frequently include foreign utilities.
4.2  Product market competition
The  degree  of  market  risk  involved  in  holding  a  company's  shares  is  likely  to  be
influenced by the level of competition in the relevant industry. A monopolistic firm has
more  power  than  a  competitive  company  to  pass  unavoidable  cost  changes  on  to
consumers  and  it  is  therefore  less  exposed  to  business  risks. It  would  therefore  be
expected that a monopoly firm would have a lower beta coefficient than a competitive
firm operating under otherwise similar circumstances.
When a utility sector is privatised, governments have a choice between restructuring the
industry  to  introduce  competition  where  feasible,  or  simply  selling  off  an  existing
monopoly  firm.  In  the  UK,  restructuring  was  considered  only  in  the  later  utility
privatisations: the electricity sector was restructured prior to privatisation whereas the gas
and  telecommunications  industries had  been  privatised  as  monopolies.  In  Argentina,
considerable restructuring  took place before privatisation, with  the gas and electricity
sectors being vertically and horizontally separated.
18In the telecommunications sector, new entry has occurred since privatisation and this may
be expected to change the beta coefficient of the incumbent firm. In the UK, Mexico and
Peru,  statutory  monopolies  on  fixed-line  telephone  services  have  already  been
undermined  by  the  introduction  of  new  technology,  such  as  cellular  networks,  by
competitors.
4.3  Industry structure
The degree of vertical  integration of an industry may have an impact on the level  of
market risk to which a company is exposed. Different parts of an industry tend to differ in
their  systematic risk levels:  in the gas  and electricity industries, for example, trading
businesses tend to be more risky than the transportation or transmission sectors. Thus, if a
company operates in a single part of a vertically separated industry it must be compared
with other companies operating in the same sector.
The  beta  coefficient  of  a  vertically integrated company might  be  expected  to  be  an
average  of the betas  of its  individual component businesses.  However, this  does  not
always appear to be  the case (although such comparisons are difficult to make). It  is
possible that a vertically integrated company may be able to  manage its  operating and
investment decisions in such a way that it is better able to deal with cyclical fluctuations.
Such 'beta synergy' is possible due to the impracticality of writing 'complete'  contracts
and the  existence of residual control  rights conferred by ownership  which  cannot be
replicated through contracts. Another possibility is that a vertically integrated company
may be  able to  foreclose potentially competitive sectors of the business and maintain
monopoly power. In either case, a vertically integrated company may be expected to have
a lower beta value than the average of its component parts.
194.4  Diversity of operation
A serious difficulty arises in trying to estimate the beta coefficient for a utility sector in
that  few  companies  are  pure  utility  operators.  First,  in  many  countries  the  same
companies operate in the electricity, gas and water sectors, making a separate beta value
for each of these sectors impossible to estimate. In both the United States and Germany,
for  example, it is usual  for energy companies to  supply both  electricity and gas  to a
particular geographical area. In such cases, beta values of companies with a similar utility
mix may be compared with one another but not with those  of other companies which
operate in a single utility sector.
Second, many companies which operate in a single utility sector have diversified into
non-utility  areas,  such  as  engineering  and  environmental  services,  communications,
property management and leisure activities. Again, it is not possible to estimate separate
beta coefficients for different divisions of a company, so the pure utility beta cannot be
determined. The non-utility areas tend to be unregulated, competitive and more risky than
the core utility services, thus diversification is expected to increase a  company's  beta
coefficient. This can help explain why some beta estimates appear unstable in Appendix 2
when the annual estimates are calculated.
Several large utility companies have international interests in the same utility sector. In
particular, many European and US companies are involved in utility projects in south-east
Asia  and  South  America.  Different  types  of  involvement  exist  including  equity
participation in existing companies and stand-alone projects. These deals often allow the
company to build a power station or water-treatment plant and then operate it at a profit
for a certain period of time before ownership of the asset passes to the state. They are
likely to be far riskier than capital investments in the domestic market, due to political
risks and greater uncertainty over building costs and future revenues. A company with
considerable involvement in overseas projects is therefore expected to have a higher beta
value than one which operates solely in the relatively secure domestic market.
205.  Empirical Approaches
Two types of comparison may be carried out using international data on privately-owned
utility companies. First, comparisons may be drawn between companies operating in the
same utility sector but in different countries where alternative regulatory regimes are in
force. Second,  the effects  of changing regulatory systems  on systematic risk  may be
assessed by studying the same number of cases where such shifts have occurred. This
section considers these approaches in turn.
5.1  Cross-country comparisons
Cross-country  comparisons  of  utility beta  coefficients  are  informative  if  one  of  the
following two circumstances applies:
two companies in the same utility sector, but operating in different countries, are
similar in every respect apart from their regulatory regime;
*  a number of companies in the same utility sector operating in different countries
differ in many respects, which may or may not include their regulatory regimes.
The first case is a straightforward comparison of regulatory systems, controlling for all
other influences. This is the ideal form of international comparison but it is impossible to
carry out because such a pair of comparators does not exist-often,  even within a country,
it is difficult to find two directly comparable companies. Direct comparisons of just  two
countries without regard for other important differences, such  as the existing UK/US
studies, are likely to be misleading and reveal little about the influence of regulatory risk
on the cost of capital.
The second case is more complex but is more likely to allow the effects of alternative
regulatory  regimes  to  be  inferred. Provided  that  a  sufficient  number  of  comparator
21countries can be assessed and all important factors affecting the cost of capital can be
identified. It should be possible to disentangle these effects and determine the importance
of regulatory risk. Although a full regression analysis may be preferable, 5 broad indicative
values may be established by averaging a number of companies operating under similar
regulatory regimes despite differences in other factors.
Averaging is not  a perfect way of controlling for differences in  the other explanatory
factors but if sufficient companies from a wide enough sample of countries are used, the
impact of other explanatory factors should be lessened. Of course, if all the companies
under one type of regime face additional risks that bias the beta coefficient upwards then
averaging will have no effect. This extreme situation is unlikely.
5.2  Within-country comparisons
In a few countries, existing regulatory systems have been significantly reformed. If this
has taken place without industrial restructuring or other changes occurring around the
same date, an effective control for non-regulatory factors is available. The data series
must be split at the appropriate date and two beta values estimated, and any significant
difference between the two should reflect a shift in regulatory risk.
Changes  have been made to  existing frameworks of regulation in the UK,  where the
price-cap system is now tending towards revenue-cap regulation, and in the United States,
Japan and Spain, where price controls and efficiency incentives are being introduced into
existing  rate-of-return  regulation  systems.  In  Malaysia  and  Argentina,  initial
privatisations  took  place  with  no  consideration  being  given to  regulation;  price-cap
systems were introduced at a later date.
5 Dummy variables for specific factors could be introduced, or if the additional explanatory variables are
observable and quantifiable, they could be directly included in the regression.
22In practice, however, analysing structural parameter shifts is not so straightforward. There
are few examples of such reforms, and some have been accompanied by changes in other
influential factors such as the degree of competition in the industry. The assessment of
recent reforms is weakened by the scarcity of data: when the returns series is short, even
daily returns give such an imprecise beta estimate that significant effects are difficult to
identify. Another  difficulty is the role of  expectations in  the stock  market,  these are
important in determining the date at which the structural shift occurs. If the change in
regulation  is  anticipated prior  to  its  implementation,  the  shift  in  beta  occurs  at  the
announcement date, while, alternatively, if investors take time to learn about the change
and its effects, a later date may be appropriate.
Another possibility is to compare the beta values of various utility sectors in a particular
country where all are subject to the same regulatory system and degree of competition.
This  would  allow sector-specific  risk factors  to  be  identified,  which  may  assist  the
analysis of regulatory differences. For example, a comparison of the electricity and gas
industries in a  single country where structural and regulatory factors are identical may
allow the difference in market risk levels to be identified. This may then assist in drawing
comparisons between combined energy companies (such as those found in Germany and
the United States) and separate electricity and gas industries in other countries.
236.  Methodology and Results
6.1  Choice of stock market index
In calculating beta values, it is usual to use an established stock market index as a proxy
for the market portfolio. In several countries, a choice of possible  indices is available.
Furthermore, a few large companies are quoted on more than one stock exchange, raising
the possibility of calculating beta values using data from a foreign stock market. World
indices are also available, quoted in either US dollars or pounds sterling, which appeared
initially to be a more appropriate market portfolio from which the beta estimates could be
derived.
The findings  of  this report  are illustrated by the  case of the US  telecommunications
operator, AT&T, as shown in Table  6.1. AT&T is quoted in both dollars and pounds
sterling, thus beta  estimates could be  calculated using a range of US,  UK  and world
indices as shown. The two world indices ($ and £) give significantly lower beta estimates
than the two US indices (NYSE All-share and Dow Jones Composite 65), while the two
UK indices (FTSE-A All-share and FTSE 100) produce estimates which are lower still.
These results indicate that systematic risk is largely country-specific and a meaningful
beta estimate can only be derived using a national index from the company's own country
of operation. Beta estimates calculated using a world index reflect the proportion of the
index that is made up of the relevant country's  securities, rather than the riskiness of the
company  in  question. Quotations  on  foreign stock  markets  are likely  to  incorporate
exchange-rate effects, which further undermine these estimates as an accurate measure of
beta.  For  these  reasons,  beta  estimates  have  only  been  calculated  against  national
indices-although  there is a risk that different stock markets will produce beta estimates
that are not entirely comparable, the use of a world index or quotations on foreign stock
markets does not appear to overcome this problem.
24If attention is restricted to national stock markets, several indices are generally available.
Often the choice is between an  'all-share'  index and one that is only  made up  of the
largest or most frequently traded companies. In an analysis of the interval problem (see
Section 6.2 and Appendices A1.3 and A3), the beta values of large companies (as the
utilities tend to be) are found to have a smaller, upwards bias when calculated against an
index consisting only of frequently traded shares. As is clear from Table 6.1 for AT&T,
the large-security indices (Dow Jones Composite 65 and FTSE  100) produce lower beta
estimates than their respective all-share indices. Economic theory suggests that large-
security indices would produce more accurate beta estimates as they are less prone to
price  adjustment lags, and  so, where possible, beta estimates in  this paper have been
derived from large-security national stock market indices.
Table 6.1: Daily asset beta estimates for AT&T against alternative indices
NYSE  All-share Dow Jones Composite  65  World  ($)  World  (£)  FT All-share  FTSE  100
0.85  0.72  0.42  0.35  0.20  0.17
In the case of AT&T, the value of 0.72, calculated using the Dow Jones Composite 65
index, has been chosen as the best estimate of the true beta value.
6.2  Choice of interval length
Another  important issue is the frequency of the data used in  calculating beta. Returns
calculated over  a  daily,  weekly, monthly  or  even longer period may be  used  in  the
calculation,  but  there is  a trade-off between two problems. Literature on  the  interval
problem (see Appendix Al.3  for a brief review) suggests that short-interval estimates are
systematically biased, such that the beta values of highly traded securities are overstated
while those of infrequently traded securities are understated. Use of longer intervals, on
the other hand, lowers the number of data points available for the calculation and the
25accuracy of the estimate is significantly reduced. A monthly beta estimate, for example,
requires at least five years'  data (60 data points) to be used while a daily beta can be
calculated for a  single year (around 250 data points). The latter estimate is the  more
meaningful if a company is subject to changes in its operating environment or regulatory
regime, as explained in Appendix A1.4.
Examples shown in Appendix A3 show the extent of the interval problem. Beta estimates
for British Gas fall as the interval length is increased while those of the two US water
companies rise with the interval length, as expected from the fact that the former is large
and frequently traded while the latter are infrequently traded. US gas companies show a
mixture of  trends, reflecting the variety of sizes of the companies in  this group. Beta
estimates for the UK RECs rise with the interval length, a slightly surprising result which
implies that these companies are relatively infrequently traded compared with the index
as a  whole. It should be noted, however, that the confidence intervals  for the longer-
interval estimates are very wide, as shown in Appendix A4. Taking the case of five-year
asset beta estimates for BT, daily data produce a 95% confidence interval of 0.81 to 0.92,
weekly data give a range of 0.79 to  1.02, while the monthly estimate lies between 0.61
and 1.03.
The response taken here to these problems has been to use daily beta estimates in order to
obtain a narrow confidence interval for betas calculated over fairly short periods and to
deal with the interval problem in the following ways. As explained in Section 6. 1, a large-
security index results in a smaller interval-effect bias  than an all-share index. Industry
averages have been calculated; where there is a range of company sizes, this procedure
should overcome the bias involved in using any single estimate. This is indicated by the
case of US gas companies given in Appendix A3: the average daily, weekly and monthly
betas for the group as a whole are very close at 0.20, 0.21 and 0.25 respectively, while
individual beta values vary substantially with the interval length.
266.3  Summary of results
Details of all the beta values calculated for this study can be found in Appendix A2. For
each company, where possible, a five-year beta calculated over the period January  1990
to August 1995 is given in addition to a series of annual betas for the years 1990 to  1994.
All are calculated using daily data and the index used in the calculation is given by the
heading for each country. All estimates are asset betas (ie, corrected for the gearing level
of the individual company) except where stated otherwise.6
Although individual companies are of interest, these results need to be  summarised in
some way so that overall trends may be identified. First, average beta values for the utility
sectors in each country were calculated. These results are given in Table 6.2, while Table
6.3 summarises the corresponding regulatory regimes for each sector.
Table 6.2: Average beta values by country and sector
Electricity  Gas  Energy  Water  Telecoms
UK  0.60  0.84  - 0.67  0.87
United States  0.30  0.20  0.25  0.29'  0.72 (AT&T)
0.52 (others)
Canada  - - 0.25  - 0.31
Japan  0.43  - - - 0.62
Argentina  0.81 e  _  _  - 0.86'
Chile  0.95 e  _-  - 1.20  e
Germany  - - 0.66  - -
Spain  0.43  0.81  - 0.57  -
Sweden  - 0.34  _  - 0.50
Australia  - 0.38  - - -
New Zealand  - - - - 0.97
Other European  0.41  0.49  0.46  0.42  0.70
Key: t Monthly beta, e Equity (not asset) beta.
6 Accounting data on a comparable basis was taken from Datastream. This was not available for all of the
countries in the study.
27Table 6.3: Summary of regulatory regimes
Electricity  Gas  Energy  Water  Telecoms
UK  RPI - X /  RPI-X  - RPI - X  RPI - X
revenue cap
United States  RoR  RoR  RoR  RoR  AT&T: RPI - X
Others: RoR
Canada  - - RoR  - RoR
Japan  RoR  - - - RoR
Argentina  RPI - X  RPI-X  - - RPI -X
Chile  RPI-X  - - -
hybrid
Germany  - - Discretionary
Spain  Tariffs  based  Discretionary
on standard
costs
Sweden  Discretionary  Discretionary  - - RPI - X
Australia  - - - -
New Zealand  - - - - Anti-competitive
rules, no price
control
Other European  Discretionary  Discretionary  - Discretionary  -
Key: RoR = rate-of-return regulation.
Regulatory  regimes  can  be  classified  according  to  the  strength  of  cost-efficiency
incentives: RPI - X and revenue-cap regimes involve high-powered incentives, rate-of-
return regulation is low-powered, while European discretionary systems are classed as
intermediate. Cross-country averages for the three types of regime were calculated for
each sector (using only asset betas); these figures are given in Table 6.4. Averaging across
companies  that  differ in  trading frequency, operating environment  and  other features
should  both  help  to  overcome  the  interval  problem  and  give  estimates  that  reflect
differences in regulatory risk rather than other factors. Finally, averages across sectors
were produced to give a single figure for each regime type, as shown in Table 6.5.
28Table 6.4: Average asset beta values by regulatory regime and sector
Incentives  Electricity  Gas  Energy  Water  Telecoms
High-powered  0.57  0.84  - 0.67  0.77
Intermediate  0.41  0.57  0.64  0.46  0.70
Low-powered  0.35  0.20  0.25  0.29  0.47





Both the sectoral averages and the overall regime estimates show a clear  trend: high-
powered  incentives appear to be related to higher systematic risk, while low-powered
incentives imply low market risk.
297.  Summary and Conclusions
This paper has covered a wide range of countries, utility sectors and regulatory systems in
order to analyse the extent of regulatory risk under alternative regimes. Economic theory
suggests that  regulatory differences  may cause the  degree of market  risk  borne  by  a
company to vary significantly, with an inverse relationship existing between the degree of
risk and the level of cost-efficiency incentives imposed on the company.
Existing comparisons of regulatory risk tend to be somewhat limited in scope. There is a
clear disparity between the beta values of utility companies in the United States and the
UK, which is usually attributed to the relatively safe operating environment in the United
States provided by rate-of-return regulation. However, the observed difference may be
due to any of a number of alternative factors and cannot be said to prove the existence of
higher regulatory risk in the UK.
This study has covered a much wider sample of countries and regulatory systems in an
attempt to formulate a more robust comparison of the risks borne by companies under
alternative  regimes.  The  method  that  was  used,  which  averaged  across  a  range  of
companies of varying sizes and operating in diverse environments, aimed to overcome the
effects  of  other  exogenous  factors  and  therefore  improve  the  accuracy  with  which
regulatory  risks  may be  identified. The  results  show  a  clear  pattern  at  the  level  of
individual  utility sectors  and  for  regulatory regimes  as  a whole.  Regimes  with  low-
powered  incentives tend  to  coexist  with  low  asset  beta  values,  while high-powered
incentives  imply  significantly higher  beta  values.  These  results,  in  accordance  with
existing comparisons of regulatory regimes, seem to imply that companies under RPI - X
regulation are exposed to much higher levels of systematic risk in comparison with those
under rate-of-return regulation, and that the cost of capital for these firms is therefore
likely to be higher.
30However, these figures  must not  be  accepted without a  number of caveats. First,  the
whole project of drawing comparisons between beta values on an international scale is
subject to difficulties. Companies are quoted on individual national stock markets and
different  market indices must be used in  each case. Indices differ in  composition  and
calculation methods, introducing a possible  source of non-comparability between beta
estimates. For example, in a country where utility companies form a large proportion of
total market capitalisation, the index reflects movements in utility shares to a great extent
and beta estimates will be high.
Furthermore, national stock markets operate in different ways and are prone to different
degrees of interval bias. Utility companies differ in size and, because of this, their beta
values are likely to be biased in different directions. For example, UK utilities tend to be
large relative to the market as a whole, whereas US utilities are regionally based and may
be quite small. For this reason, estimated beta values could be expected to overstate the
degree of market risk borne by UK utilities while the risk incurred by US utilities  is
understated.  The  much-quoted  difference between  US  and  UK  utility  betas,  usually
attributed to differences  in regulatory risk, may simply reflect the systematic interval-
effect biases that are present in these estimates.
Although this study has covered a wide range of countries and companies, the sectoral
and  overall  regime  averages  for  high-  and  low-powered  incentives  still  tend  to  be
dominated by UK and US companies respectively. This is due to difficulties in finding
the  necessary  data  for  suitable  comparator  companies.  In  most  countries,  utility
companies have traditionally been under state or local authority control and the number of
private companies under altemative regulatory regimes is limited. Few European utilities
are under explicit price-cap or rate-of-return regulation, indeed, the United States aside,
clear regulatory systems are a relatively recent phenomenon. Privatisations in developing
countries  provide  scope  for  interesting comparisons between  regulatory regimes,  but
adequate data is difficult to come by and beta estimates derived from these markets are
likely to be even more flawed that those for European and North American companies.
31Where market data does not exist for a country or sector the information reported in this
paper  can  provide  a  starting  point for  the  estimation  of  an  appropriate equity  beta.
Obviously,  qualitative  adjustments  will  have to  be  made  to  take  account  of  special
circumstances and specific company betas may assist in this. The data reported in this
study should, however, be of value in providing initial assessments of betas of utilities
operating under different regulatory regimes.
32Appendix Al  Estimation Difficulties
This  section considers practical  and theoretical difficulties involved in estimating beta
coefficients from available data. There are several explanations of why beta coefficients
may be  biased,  and  some  of  these  reasons  cause  severe  problems  for  international
comparisons of estimated beta values. When these estimates are derived using data from
different stock markets, the extent and direction of bias in each estimate may differ and
the comparison is likely to be very misleading unless corrections can be made for these
distortions.
AM.l  Data format and availability
AL.I.A  No trade periods
A fundamental assumption of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is that all
securities are continuously traded and that the price at which such trades may take
place is known at each moment in time. In practice, however, shares are traded at
discrete times and there are many periods during which no trades take place.
In many stock markets, the measured price for a given share is the price at which
its latest trade took place. This method opens up the possibility that the notional
price at which a trade would occur may change without any actual trade taking
place,  resulting  in discrepancies between  measured and  'true'  values. In  more
sophisticated stock exchanges data is available for quotation as well as transaction
prices, which overcomes the no-trade problem in these markets but may distort
comparisons with beta values estimated from transaction data.
33A1.1.2 Transaction costs
A second difficulty is the spread between buying and selling prices arising from
transaction costs, a feature of real-world markets that is ignored by the CAPM.
When considering the returns to a portfolio of assets, these must be calculated as a
percentage of the buying price of the portfolio. Difficulties arise when the bid/ask
spread varies over time, due to changes in transaction procedures or the degree of
competition  in  stock  market  trading.  Changes  in  transaction  costs  affect  the
variability of measured returns while true returns remain unaffected, so distorting
calculations of the beta estimate. These changes are unlikely to be synchronised
across  international capital  markets,  so  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  the
direction of bias will be the same in different countries.
A1.1.3 Dividend corrections
The returns to holding equity are made up of two parts: a capital gain on the price
of the share  itself and any dividend payments made by  the company. Thus,  a
calculation of the total return to equity requires a dividend correction. In order that
the variance of a security and its covariance with the market may be calculated
correctly, any dividend payment must be added to the share price at the time when
the payment is made. Many documented returns series treat dividend payments as
if  they  were  spread  throughout  the  year  rather  than  occurring  at  particular
moments, once or twice a year. International comparisons require returns data to
be  constructed on a consistent basis, which should also be as close to the true
values as possible.
A1.1.4 Calculation of returns
As pointed out by Roll (1983),7 the method by which the average returns on a
portfolio or index are calculated can significantly affect their estimated value. Roll
7  Roll (1983), 'On Computing  Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium', Journal of  Financial
Economics,  12,  371-386.
34compares three computational methods for obtaining the return on a portfolio of
securities over an interval of time:
*  arithmetic:  the mean daily return is  obtained by  averaging across  both
firms and days-this  is then compounded to give the portfolio return over
a longer period;
*  rebalanced: the return on a portfolio is rebalanced at the end of each period
to maintain equal investments;
*  buy-and-hold: individual security returns over the required time period are
calculated from daily returns and then averaged over securities to give the
portfolio return.
Roll finds that the method used to calculate mean returns has a significant effect
on the estimated return, such that the apparent premium to holding a portfolio
made up of smaller rather than larger issues is approximately halved when the
buy-and-hold approach is used. He argues that this method is the most plausible as
it  mimics  the behaviour of  actual investors, as  their transaction costs  prevent
regular  rebalancing  of portfolios.  The buy-and-hold approach  is  the preferred
method used in academic work on the estimation of beta values, such as Handa et
al. (1989).'
In making international comparisons, it is important to ensure that returns data is
calculated  on  the  same  basis,  which  should  preferably  be  the  buy-and-hold
method.  This  may require  new market  indices to  be  calculated, as  published
indices tend to be rebalanced and the frequency of adjustment is likely to  vary
across countries.
8 Handa, Kothari  and Wasley (1989), 'The Relation Between  the Return Interval and Betas', Journal of
Financial  Economics,  23, 79-100.
35A1.2  Aggregation and the market portfolio
A1.2.1 The market portfolio
The cost of equity finance for an individual security is related to the level of its
non-diversifiable  risk.  Thus,  the  variance  of  the  security's  returns  must  be
compared to their covariance with the market portfolio, consisting of the optimal
combination of all available assets. This calculation requires some proxy for the
market  portfolio  to be  used.  Ideally, this  should be  an  index of  world  assets
including not only equities but also bonds and durable goods such as housing.
In practice, however, researchers usually take a national equity market index as a
proxy for the world index. The use of national rather than international markets
can  be  justified  by  the  argument  that  today's  capital  markets  are essentially
international and arbitrage ensures that prices and the risk-return  trade-off  are
equalised between markets. Other assets, such as housing and bonds, are generally
ignored-again,  arbitrage is  assumed to  ensure that  the risk-return  profile  for
these assets mirrors those of the assets included in the index and so their omission
does not cause problems.
However,  differences  in the composition  of national  stock  markets mean  that
comparisons  of beta  values calculated using national  market returns  could be
misleading. For example, some small stock markets are dominated by  a single
large company, in which case market returns are not representative of the world
index.  A  few  capital  markets,  such  as  that  of  Korea,  are  insulated  from
international influences and are therefore likely to differ considerably from the
world index, rendering a meaningful comparison of beta estimates impossible. It
may be necessary to construct a portfolio of world assets and use its returns index
to estimate beta values for all securities in order to eliminate problems associated
with unrepresentative national markets.
36A1.2.2 Differential taxation and transaction costs
As argued above, arbitrage is a powerful mechanism for ensuring that the risk-
return trade-off is equalised between different types of assets and across countries.
However,  even  with  complete  arbitrage, prices are  affected by  differences  in
transaction costs and levels of taxation applied to various assets. Investors respond
to post-tax returns while the companies themselves are concerned about pre-tax
levels, thus variations in this spread affect the cost of capital. In several countries,
steps are being taken to eliminate gross distortions in the tax system, for example,
the recent reductions in the preferential treatment of house purchases in the UK.
However,  significant cross-country differences  in transaction  costs  or taxation
systems  are  likely  to  undermine  the  comparability  of  beta  estimates  unless
corrections can be made for these distortions.
A1.2.3 Weighting of the index
Another issue concerns the weights that should be applied to different assets in the
market portfolio. A portfolio consisting of an equal investment in each security is
unlikely to be optimal, as most investors would choose to put  fewer funds into
very risky assets. Thus, market capitalisation is generally used to  weight each
security,  so  that  large  companies  form  a  greater  proportion  of  the  portfolio.
However, when making international comparisons, there is no guarantee that the
different  national  market  indices  are  weighted  in  a  consistent  manner  and
calculation of a new index may be necessary.
A1.3  Choice of interval period
Beta coefficients may be calculated from daily, weekly, monthly or even annual data, as
long  as  a  sufficient number of  data points  are used. Theoretically, the  length of  the
interval over which returns are calculated should not affect the result. However, empirical
studies have found the estimated value of beta to alter significantly and systematically
37with the interval length, resulting in a wide-ranging academic debate. Several sources of
bias have been noted and analysed, with conflicting affects on the estimate of beta as the
interval length is increased.
A1.3.1 Non-synchronous trading
Fisher (1966)9 pointed out that the prices recorded at the end of a time interval are
often due to a transaction which occurred earlier in or prior to that period. For this
reason, the market index is in fact an average of the temporally ordered underlying
values  of the  shares  rather  than  synchronised trades. This  causes  the  returns
calculated from the index to be serially correlated and their estimated variance to
be biased downwards. If, in addition, a share suffers from non-trading or is traded
only  infrequently,  its  covariance  with  the  market  will  be  significantly
underestimated.  Both  the market  variance and  an  asset's  covariance  with  the
market rise with the return interval, but if these increases are not proportional, the
estimated beta coefficient will be biased. Scholes and Williams (1977)10  find the
following directions of bias in beta estimates when a short interval is used.
Table A1.1: Bias in beta estimation due to non-synchronous trading
Type  Direction  of bias  in beta estimate
Infrequently  traded  securities  Downwards
Securities  with  average  trading  frequencies  Upwards
Very frequently  traded  securities  Downwards
The  availability of  quoted prices at times  when no  transaction  occurs  should
overcome the non-synchronous trading problem. If the close-of-day prices from
either a trade or a quote are synchronous, then the Scholes-Williams  bias  is no
longer an issue.
9 Fisher  (1966):  'Some New  Stock-market  Indexes',  Journal  of Business,  39, 191-225.
10  Scholes and Williams (1977), 'Estimating  Betas from Nonsynchronous  Data', Journal of Financial
Economics,  5, 309-327.
38A1.3.2 Price-adjustment delays
Dimson  (1979)  and  Cohen  et  al.  (1983)11 consider  more  persistent  price-
adjustment  delays,  due  to  frictions  in  the  capital  market,  which  may  affect
quotation as well as trade prices. These authors find a different pattern of biases in
beta from that analysed by Scholes and Williams, as shown in Table A1.2. Also,
they find that these biases occur even for interval lengths longer than a single day,
with  estimates  becoming  asymptotically  consistent  as  the  period  length  is
increased.
Table A1.2: Bias in beta estimation due to price adjustment lags
Type  Direction  of bias in beta estimate
Infrequently  traded  securities  Downwards
Very  frequently  traded  securities  Upwards
A1.3.3 Length of the investment horizon
Levhari and Levy (1977)12  comment on a different form of bias in calculated beta
coefficients: several researchers report a tendency for high-risk (aggressive) stocks
to  earn  lower  returns  than  those  estimated  by  the  CAPM,  while  low-risk
(defensive)  stocks  exceed  predictions.  Levhari  and  Levy  give  an  explanation
based on a discrepancy between the actual and theoretical length of the investment
horizon. The CAPM assumes that investors maximise their returns over a single
time period, which may be of any length as long as it is identical for all investors.
When  the  assumed  investment  horizon  differs  from  the  actual  one  used  by
investors,  the  estimated  beta  coefficient  will  be  systematically biased.  The
direction of this effect varies according to whether the assumed horizon is too
long or too short, as summarised in Table A1.3.
l  Dimson (1979), 'Risk Management  When Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading', Journal of
Financial  Economics,  7, 197-226;  Cohen,  Hawawini,  Maier, Schwartz  and  Whitcomb  (1983), 'Friction in
the Trading  Process  and the Estimation  of Systematic  Risk', Journal  of Financial  Economics,  12, 263-278.
12 Levhari and Levy (1977), 'The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Investment  Horizon', Review of
Economic  Studies,  92-104.
39Table A1.3: Bias in beta estimation due to investment horizon length
Type  Assumed investment  Assumed investment
horizon is too long  horizon is too short
Aggressive stock (J > 1)  Beta is over-estimated  Beta is under-estimated
Neutral stock (J3  =  1)  Beta is correctly estimated  Beta is correctly estimated
Defensive stock (  <  1)  Beta is under-estimated  Beta is over-estimated
The authors argue that the true horizon for most investors is likely to be more than
a year, thus estimates based on a period length shorter than this will tend to under-
estimate high beta values and over-estimate low ones.
A1.3.4 International differences in interval effects
The biases in estimated beta values for different national markets are unlikely to
be  of  the same degree and  may not  even be  in the  same direction. First,  the
availability of quotation data for some markets should reduce misestimation  in
these cases, while serious biases remain in other markets. Second, differences in
transaction costs and trading methods may affect the extent of adjustment delays
and non-synchronous trading problems, such that the degree of autocorrelation in
market returns, varies between countries.
Third, there is some evidence that the size of the relevant stock market affects the
seriousness of the intervalling effect. Berglund et al. (1983)13  find the length of
the adjustment process to be related to the total turnover of the exchange rather
than  the trading  frequency of the particular  stock,  such that  adjustment takes
longer in a small stock market. Martikainen and Perttunen (1991)14  demonstrate
that,  contrary to  the findings  of  Handa et al.  (1989), the  size effect  tends  to
increase rather than decrease with the return interval in a thin stock market.
13  Berglund,  Wahlroos and Ornmark (1983), 'The Weak-form  Efficiency of the Finnish and Scandinavian
Stock  Exchanges',  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 85, 521-530.
14  Martikainen and  Perttunen  (1991),  'Return  Intervals,  Systematic  Risk  Estimates  and  Firm  Size',
Economic Letters, 36, 311-315.
40A1.4  Changes in company structure or environment
Some of the arguments outlined above imply that a longer rather than a shorter returns
interval should be used to  estimate beta. However, use of  a longer interval (say, one
month) requires several years' data, whereas a beta estimate based on daily data could be
calculated for a single year. The common approach of calculating a monthly beta from
data over  a five-year period is flawed if the company's  capital structure or  operating
environment is not constant over this time.
A1.4.1 Changes in company gearing
The CAPM implicitly assumes that a company's  gearing ratio is constant over
time and that its marginal gearing (the proportions in which debt and equity are
currently being issued) is therefore equal to its overall gearing ratio at the present
time.  For  real-world  companies,  however,  significant  shifts  in  gearing  over
relatively short periods of time can be observed. When data over a long period
(say, five years) is used to estimate a company's equity beta and its gearing ratio
changes over this time, calculation of its asset beta using end-of-period gearing is
likely to be misleading. The riskiness of the company's equity tends to change
with its gearing ratio and so the use of an inappropriate gearing ratio causes the
asset beta to be miscalculated.
When a company's  gearing ratio is found to change over the estimation period,
two approaches may be used:
*  use the average gearing ratio over the estimation interval, rather than its
end-of-period value;
*  carry out the estimation over a shorter interval; say, one year instead of
five.
41The second approach is related to the intervalling effects covered in Section A1.3:
clearly,  the gearing issue must  be  considered along  with  the issues  discussed
earlier when a choice of estimation period is made.
A1.4.2 Regulatory changes
As outlined in Section A1.3, one approach to the assessment of regulatory risk is
to  study the  effect  on  a  company's  beta  value  when its  regulatory  regime  is
altered. This methodology requires beta values to be estimated over short time
periods of one to two years so that the effects of recent changes can be assessed.
In such cases, the short data period requires beta values to be estimated from daily
rather than monthly returns so that the number of data points is sufficient for a
reasonable degree of accuracy to be obtained.
A1.5: Estimating debt betas
In Section 2 the relationship between asset, equity and debt betas was briefly outlined.
Although this paper has adopted the standard assumption of zero debt betas it is worth
considering the evidence on the value of debt betas if this assumption is relaxed. It is not
possible to apply any assumption but that of zero debt betas in the main body of the work,
owing  to  the  amount  and  sophistication  of  the  information  required.  However,  by
considering the available evidence the relevant importance of this  assumption can be
tested.
42Table A1.4: Data on debt betas
Company  Bond  Premium (basis points)  Debt betaa
BAA  £250m, 8.5%, 2021  85  0.14
Electrobras  $50m, 10%, 1999  431  0.72
Telebras  Lira 350 billion, 13%, 1999  345  0.58
BT  £500m, 7.125%, 2003  16  0.03
BT  £229m, 12.25%, 2006  35  0.06
Nynex  $150m, 8.75%, 2004  76  0.13
Note:  a A  simplification has  been made by  assuming that the  equity risk  premium is  constant  across
countries at 6%.
Sources: Financial Times and Datastream.
As can be seen from the table, debt betas can vary from close to zero, for large utility
companies in developed countries, to close to one, for utilities in developing countries. Of
course, the assumptions underlying the debt beta calculation have an important impact on
the value found and so these figures are being used purely for illustrative purposes rather
than precise measures of the actual debt betas. Table A1.5 provides an estimate of the
asset beta for two of the companies with debt betas. These are then compared to the asset
betas calculated on the standard assumption.
Table A1.5: Asset beta estimates
Company  Equity beta  Debt beta  Gearing  Asset beta
BT  0.98  0.06  0.12  0.87
Nynex  0.69  0.13  0.35  0.49
Table A1.6: Impact on asset beta estimate
Company  Zero debt beta  Non-zero debt beta
BT  0.87  0.87
Nynex  0.45  0.49
43From Table Al.6  it can be seen that the impact of relaxing the assumption is slight. In
BT's  case there is no change in the asset beta estimate while for Nynex the asset beta
rises by 0.04. Where larger debt betas exist it is likely that a more significant impact will
be observed, however, lack of data makes quantifying this impact impossible.
A1.6  Conclusions
The estimation  of beta values, particularly in an  international context,  is fraught with
practical and theoretical difficulties. Hence a great deal of care must be taken in making
the estimates if any meaningful comparisons are to be drawn. First, some methodology
for overcoming the theoretical sources of bias must be established, perhaps involving a
particular  choice  of returns  interval or a  regression procedure for  obtaining  unbiased
estimates.  Second,  appropriate and  consistent data  must  be  collected  for  the  various
countries, and then beta estimates calculated in the same way in each case.
44Appendix A2 Asset Beta Estimates
Key:  e indicates an equity rather than an asset beta estimate.
'indicates  that security has severe infrequent trading problems and is likely to be
biased downwards.
A2.1  Europe
A2.1.1  Austria  Index: Austria traded index (ATX)
OMV AG (elec)  Vienna Airport
Five-year beta  0.85  0.50 (1992-95)
1990  1.34
1991  0.65
1992  0.83  -
1993  0.69  0.71
1994  0.75  1.05
A2.1.2  Belgium  Index: Brussels Stock Exchange General Index
Electrabel (electricity)  Tractebel (electricity & gas)
Five-year beta  0.40  0.46
1990  0.26  0.97
1991  0.33  0.33
1992  0.41  0.34
1993  0.48  0.28
1994  0.64  0.39
45A2.1.3  Denmark  Index: Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index
Tele Danmark  Copenhagen Airport
1994-95  1.10  0.44et
A2.1.4  France  Index: Paris CAC40
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez (water)






A2.1.5  Germany  Index: Deutsche Aktien (DAX)
Regional energy companies
Badenwerk  Berliner Kraft &  Eschweiler  Isar Amperwerke
Licht  Bergwerk
Five-year beta  0.23  0.25  0.03t  0.12
1990  0.31  0.36  0.10  0.12
1991  0.36  0.24  -0.05  0.13
1992  0.19  0.02  0.05  0.05
1993  0.09  0.16  0.03  0.13
1994  -0.02  0.24  -0.04  0.19
Regional energy companies  (continued)
Rheinelectra  RWE  Thyssen  VEBA  VIAG
Five-year beta  0.54  2.34*  0.84  0.83  0.77
1990  0.57  1.42  0.98  0.93  0.98
1991  0.49  2.11  0.81  0.86  0.80
1992  0.29  1.94  0.88  0.63  0.72
1993  0.79  2.19  0.82  0.62  0.71
1994  0.54  2.25  0.70  0.84  0.66
* High value due to large negative gearing ratio.
46A2.1.6  Italy  Index: Milan Stock Exchange index
Italgas  Acquedotti  Acquedotti  Telecom  Ferrovie Nord
Potabili  de Ferrari  Italia  Milano
(water)  RNC (water)  (railway)
Five-year beta  0.44  0.16 "  0.47  1  0.30  0.44 . t
1990  0.36  0.42  1.28  0.21  -
1991  0.46  0.22  0.89  0.19  0.63
1992  0.31  0.22  0.24  0.16  0.13
1993  0.46  0.16  0.11  0.23  0.44
1994  0.58  0.08  0.32  0.45  0.65
A2.1.7  The Netherlands  Index: Amsterdam All Share general index
KPN (post & telecoms)
Five-year beta  0.61 e
A2.1.8  Norway  Index: Oslo Stock Exchange index
Norsk Hydro (gas)






47A2.1.9  Spain  Index: IBEX 35
Endesa  Elec.  Enher  Sevillana  Gas  Aguas
Reunidas  Natural  Barcelona
SDG  (water)
Five-year  0.58  0.60  0.31  0.24  0.81  0.57
beta
1990  0.40  - - 0.22  0.67  -
1991  0.31  - - 0.14  0.61  -
1992  0.53  - - 0.23  0.57  -
1993  0.65  - 0.32  0.21  0.94  0.68
1994  0.88  0.54  0.30  0.32  1.12  0.74
A2.1.10  Sweden  Index: Veckans Affarer weighted all share index
Sydkraft (gas)  Kinnevik Ind. (telecoms)
Five-year beta  0.34'  0.50'
1990  - 0.32
1991  - 0.13
1992  0.32  0.57
1993  0.32  0.51
1994  0.35  0.88
A2.1.11  Switzerland  Index: Swiss market index
Electrowatt (elec)  Motor-Columbus (elec)
Five-year beta  0.15'  0.24'
1990  - 0.34
1991  _
1992  0.12
1993  0.14  -
1994  0.19  0.13
48A2.1.12  UK  Index: FT-SE 100
Regional electricity  companies
Eastern  East  London  Manweb  Midlands  Northern
Midlands
Five-year  0.55  0.56  0.59  0.57  0.56  0.54
beta
1990  - - - - - -
1991  - - - - - -
1992  0.50  0.46  0.51  0.55  0.46  0.49
1993  0.33  0.42  0.41  0.40  0.44  0.35
1994  0.62  0.63  0.60  0.58  0.63  0.66
Regional  electricity companies  (continued)
Norweb  SEEBOARD  Southern  South  South  Yorkshire
Wales  Western
Five-year  0.59  0.64  0.61  0.61  0.52  0.56
beta
1990  - - - - - -
1991  - - - - - -
1992  0.55  0.56  0.58  0.65  0.46  0.52
1993  0.32  0.42  0.39  0.36  0.33  0.45
1994  0.69  0.76  0.66  0.57  0.54  0.55
Generators  and  vertically integrated  electricity  companies
National  PowerGen  Scottish-  Hydro-Electric  Northern
Power  Power  Ireland
Electricity
Five-year beta  0.78  0.75  0.67  0.58  0.60O
1990  - - - - -
1991  - - - -
1992  0.66  0.66  - -
1993  0.84  0.82  0.69  0.63
1994  1.03  1.05  1.16  1.01
t 1993-95 figure.
49Gas and  telecommunications
British Gas  British Telecom  Vodaphone
Five-year beta  0.84  0.87  1.13
1990  0.92  0.88  1.27
1991  0.84  0.77  0.86
1992  0.59  0.70  1.15
1993  0.89  0.95  1.22
1994  1.08  1.02  1.10
Water
Anglian  Northumbrian  North West  Severn Trent  Southern
Five-year beta  0.53  0.66  0.71  0.79  0.60
1990  - - - -
1991  0.60  1.08  0.74  1.12  0.66
1992  0.69  1.05  0.97  1.12  0.73
1993  0.36  0.25  0.42  0.46  0.30
1994  0.64  0.56  0.79  0.77  0.72
Water  (continued)
South West  Thames  Welsh  Wessex  Yorkshire
Five-year beta  0.87  0.63  0.76  0.66  0.53
1990  - - - - -
1991  1.75  0.71  0.95  0.61  0.54
1992  1.47  0.80  1.18  0.93  0.65
1993  0.45  0.38  0.39  0.25  0.32
1994  0.55  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.55
50A2.2  North  America
A2.2.1  Canada  Index: Toronto Stock Exchange composite index
Atco  Canadian  Utilities  Nova Corp.
Five-year beta  0.08  0.15  0.55
1990  0.12  0.13  0.42
1991  0.11  0.07  0.40
1992  0.03  0.18  0.50
1993  0.07  0.11  0.46
1994  0.06  0.21  0.68
Nova Scotia  Transalta  Bell Canada  BC Telecom
Power  Enterprises
(telecommunications)
Five-year beta  0.13 t  0.36t  0.31  0.31
1990  - 0.40  0.30  0.30
1991  0.22  0.27  0.30
1992  - 0.24  0.33  0.40
1993  0.04  0.05  0.17  0.06
1994  0.20  0.64  0.40  0.46
t 1992-95 figure.
A2.2.2  United States  Index: Dow Jones composite 65
Combined electricity/gas companies
Baltimore  CMS Energy  Consolidated  LG&E  Long Island
Gas & Elec  Edison NY  Energy  Lighting
Five-year beta  0.32  0.19  0.47  0.19  0.15'
1990  0.29  0.22  0.38  - 0.16
1991  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.15  0.14
1992  0.22  0.11  0.12  0.07  0.08
1993  0.45  0.14  0.28  0.19  0.19
1994  0.47  0.27  0.39  0.42  0.21
51Combined electricity/gas companies (continued)
MDU  Niagara  Northern  Pacific Gas  Peco Energy
Resources  Mohawk  States Power  & Electric
Power
Five-yearbeta  0.12'  0.25  0.38  0.37  0.31
1990  0.08  0.26  0.48  0.36  0.33
1991  0.14  0.18  0.25  0.32  0.18
1992  0.05  0.20  0.25  0.26  0.21
1993  0.17  0.28  0.41  0.35  0.40
1994  0.25  0.41  0.50  0.57  0.42
Combined electricity/gas  companies (continued)
Public Service  San Diego Gas  Scana  Washington
Co. of Colorado  & Electric  Water  Power
Five-year beta  0.24  0.21  0.20  0.12'
1990  0.27  0.23  0.17  0.10
1991  0.15  0.09  0.16  0.07
1992  0.18  0.07  0.14  0.03
1993  0.31  0.24  0.16  0.16
1994  0.36  0.43  0.35  0.23
Gas  companies
Atlanta  Gas  Brooklyn Union  Connecticut  Enserch
Light  Gas  Natural  Gas
Five-year beta  0.19  0.14'  0.14'  0.39
1990  0.18  0.10  0.10  0.40
1991  0.23  0.08  0.24  0.43
1992  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.36
1993  0.13  0.19  0.14  0.31
1994  0.29  0.41  0.17  0.51
52Gas companies  (continued)
Florida  Public  Natural  Fuel  New Jersey  Nicor
Utilities  Gas Co  Resources
Five-year beta  0.08t  0.21  0.10'  0.29
1990  0.18  0.18  0.11  0.28
1991  0.03  0.14  0.03  0.31
1992  0.01  0.31  0.06  0.18
1993  0.09  0.15  0.18  0.18
1994  0.09  0.37  0.20  0.48
Gas companies  (continued)
North  Carolina  Northwest  ONEOK  Wisconsin Energy
Natural  Gas  Natural  Gas
Five-year beta  0.06t  0.12'  0.35  0.29
1990  0.12  0.18  0.38  0.26
1991  0.05  0.13  0.33  0.21
1992  -0.06  0.04  0.31  0.13
1993  0.00  0.11  0.39  0.43
1994  0.14  0.09  0.41  0.49
Electricity  companies
AEP  Carolina  Duke Power  Entergy  KU Energy
Industries  Power &  Corp.
Light
Five-year beta  0.46  0.37  0.40  0.25  0.24
1990  0.68  0.40  0.34  0.26  0.25
1991  0.19  0.27  0.30  0.19  0.16
1992  0.43  0.19  0.24  0.16  0.16
1993  0.23  0.49  0.47  0.29  0.34
1994  0.84  0.57  0.42  0.36  0.32
53Electricity  companies  (continued)
New England  Puget Sound  Union Electric  Unicom
Electric  Systems  Power & Light
Five-year beta  0.24  0.18  0.27  0.31
1990  0.27  0.15  0.25  0.43
1991  0.11  0.16  0.11  0.24
1992  0.18  0.13  0.25  0.16
1993  0.30  0.20  0.34  0.28
1994  0.43  0.32  0.48  0.47
Water
Consumers  Water  Philadelphia  Suburban
Five-year beta  0.07'  0.12 t
1990  0.12  0.15
1991  0.04  0.07
1992  0.20  0.13
1993  0.12  0.11
1994  -0.02  0.14
Telecommunications
AT&T  Bell Atlantic  Bell South  Nynex
Five-year beta  0.72  0.57  0.55  0.45
1990  0.96  0.85  0.65  0.59
1991  0.69  0.52  0.62  0.38
1992  0.53  0.19  0.31  0.30
1993  0.78  0.56  0.55  0.33
1994  0.60  0.50  0.52  0.61
54A2.3  South America
A2.3.1  Argentina  Index: IFC emerging markets weekly index
NB: These are weekly, not daily, beta estimates.
Central  Costanera  Central  Puerto  (elec)  Telef6nica de
(elec)  Argentina
1994-95  0.74 e  0.87  -
1992-95  - - 0.86  e
Index: Dow Jones Composite 65 (daily beta estimates)
Central  Costanera  Central  Puerto  ADS  Telefonica de
ADR  Argentina  ADR
1994-95  1.92  e  1.21  -
1992-95  - - 1.57 e
A2.3.2  Chile  Index: IFC emerging markets weekly index
NB: These are weekly, not daily, beta estimates
[  Endesa (elec)  Emelsa (elec)  Emelat  (elec)  Entel (telecoms)
|Five-year  beta  0.95 e  0.72 e  0.77  C  1.20 e
Enersis  (elec)  Enersis  ADR*  Chilgener  (elec)  Chilgener  ADR*
|Five-year  beta  1.24 e  1.09 e (1993-95)  1.09 e  0.76 e  (1994-95)
* ADR is quoted in $ and the beta calculation uses daily data and the Dow Jones Composite 65 index
55A2.4.  South-east  Asia
A2.4.1  Japan  Index: Nikkei 50
Tokyo  Chubu  Kansai  Matsushita  Mitsubishi  NTT
Electric  Electric  Electric  Electric  Electric  (telecoms)
Power  Power  Power  Works
Five-year  0.28  0.29  0.34  0.57  0.69  0.62
beta
1990  0.42  0.52  0.54  0.70  0.89  0.48
1991  0.32  0.25  0.37  0.60  0.75  0.65
1992  0.26  0.32  0.30  0.53  0.62  0.60
1993  0.36  0.30  0.37  0.62  0.65  0.98
1994  0.20  0.15  0.17  0.52  0.67  0.68
A2.5  Australia and New Zealand
A2.5.1  Australia  Index: Australian All-share Index
AGL






A2.5.2  New Zealand  Index: NZ Capital 40 Index
Telecom Corp.






Note: NZ Capital 40 Index is not available prior to 1991.
56Appendix A3 Examples  of the Interval  Problem
Five-year beta estimates using daily, weekly and monthly data.
A3.1  US companies  Index: Dow Jones Composite 65
Table A3.1: US gas companies
Atlanta  Brooklyn  Connecticut  Enserch  Florida  Natural Fuel
Gas Light  Union Gas  Natural  Public  Gas Co
Gas  Utilities
Daily  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.39  0.08  0.21
Weekly  0.26  0.11  0.14  0.38  0.14  0.24
Monthly  0.19  0.21  -0.05  0.56  0.19  0.26
Table A3.1 (continued)
New Jersey  Nicor  N. Carolina  Northwest  ONEOK  Wisconsin
Resources  Natural  Natural  Energy
Gas  Gas
Daily  0.10  0.29  0.06  0.12  0.35  0.29
Weekly  0.13  0.26  0.24  0.10  0.27  0.30
Monthly  0.21  0.18  0.65  0.19  0.23  0.21





57Table A3.3: US water companies
Consumers Water  Philadelphia Suburban
Daily  0.07  0.12
Weekly  0.18  0.14
Monthly  0.32  0.25
A3.2  UK companies  Index: FTSE-100  index
Table A3.4: UK RECs
Eastern  East  London  Manweb  Midlands  Northern
Midlands
Daily  0.55  0.56  0.59  0.57  0.57  0.58
Weekly  0.66  0.74  0.70  0.63  0.71  0.65
Monthly  0.83  0.83  1.07  1.00  1.04  1.00
Table A3.4 (continued)
Norweb  SEEBOARD  Southern  South  South  Yorkshire
Wales  Western
Daily  0.63  0.64  0.61  0.61  0.52  0.56
Weekly  0.67  0.83  0.71  0.72  0.77  0.64
Monthly  0.83  1.13  0.95  1.08  0.92  0.84





58Table A3.6: UK gas and telecommunications  companies
British Gas  BT
Daily  0.84  0.87
Weekly  0.76  0.91
Monthly  0.67  0.82
59Appendix  A4 Confidence  Intervals  for Beta Estimates
95% confidence intervals for asset beta estimates for BT calculated using the FTSE 100
index.
Table A4.1: Confidence intervals  for five-year  beta estimates
calculated from  data with different  interval  lengths
Daily data  Weekly data  Monthly data
Asset  beta  estimate  0.87  0.91  0.82
Upper  bound  0.92  1.02  1.03
Lower  bound  0.81  0.79  0.61
Number  of observations  1,422  294  65
Table A4.2: Confidence intervals  for daily beta estimates for BT
calculated  over periods  of different  lengths
Five  year  (1990-95)  One  year  (1994)
Asset  beta  estimate  0.87  1.02
Upper bound  0.92  1.13
Lower bound  0.81  0.90
Number of observations  1,422  252
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